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This paper presents a new failure analysis method, Failure Identification for Mission 
Analysis (FIMA), which performs a general failure analysis for the overall state of a system, as 
well as a mission-specific analysis that identifies how failures may have differing effects on the 
various mission tasks that a system must complete.  The FIMA method is capable of being 
implemented at any point in the design process.  During early design stages, the FIMA method 
will identify various qualitative failure scenarios based on programmed functional relationships 
and any number of initial failures wished to be simulated.  The functional relationships for this 
method are unique in that along with traditional function-based failure modes, they also include 
manufacturing-based failure modes in each component’s performance model.  The models are 
then used to determine fault propagation paths as well as each failure scenario’s criticality on the 
overall system performance.  During later design stages, the FIMA method will introduce the 
usage of physics-based governing equations to more accurately identify the system’s behavior 
during different failure scenarios. The FIMA method is unique in its ability to identify a specific 
failure scenario’s effects on a system’s overall performance and then apply this failure 
information to specific mission tasks.  The FIMA method uses multiple metrics to determine the 
effects of a given failure scenario on a potential mission plan and then uses other unique metrics 
to assess and optimize a new mission plan based on the remaining tasks and the remaining 
functionality of the system’s components.   This method is demonstrated in two different 
theoretical case studies with experimental validation to be conducted in the future.  The results of 
the first case study will show how the FIMA method is able to automatically identify a large 
variety of possible failure scenarios and their varying effects on the overall system’s 
performance, while the second case study will show the FIMA method’s mission analysis 
 
capabilities by using multiple unique metrics for mission comparisons and optimizations during 
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In a time when every new technology seems to be vastly more complex and sophisticated 
than its predecessor, it is obvious that the methods dedicated to modeling and analyzing these 
technologies must also become more complex and sophisticated.  Technological advancements 
have allowed for the creation of many complex systems capable of performing a variety of tasks 
a variety of different ways, simplifying processes and helping automate many industries. 
Unfortunately, along with the benefits of being able to produce complex behaviors, complex 
systems also produce complex failures, and herein lies possibly the biggest challenge currently 
faced in understanding complex systems; complex failure analysis can be incredibly difficult due 
to the fact that the different functions of a complex system may all experience significantly 
different effects from the same failures.  Therefore, the various possible use-cases of a complex 
system must be taken into account for accurate failure analysis.  For example, if an airplane’s 
landing gear fails in the open position, this failure would affect the performance while cruising, 
however, during takeoff and landing the failure would be inconsequential.  Unfortunately, most 
current failure analysis methods are ill equipped for such comprehensive complex system 
analysis due to their mission independence. A mission is defined here as the system’s high-level 
objective; for example, an airplane getting from point A to point B would be its mission.  
Mission tasks, on the other hand, are the discrete actions that must be done to complete a 
mission; for example, taking off, cruising a particular route, and landing would be three abstract 
mission tasks for an airplane. Current methods typically only identify potential failures and their 
likely effects on component and system-level behaviors in a general sense, but do not identify 
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how the faulty behaviors will affect the system’s ability to complete specific mission tasks, i.e. 
they do not take into account the three stages of flight in the previously stated example, and 
therefore, would not accurately be able to determine the severity of a failure on the various 
mission tasks.  
According to the Failure Identification and Mission Analysis (FIMA) method presented 
in this paper, accurate complex system failure analysis depends on three factors: the internal 
system state, the external system state, and the internal system’s mission.  An internal system is 
any collection of interconnected functional entities, or components, such as an airplane. An 
external system is the environment with which the internal system interacts, and a mission is a 
task, or set of tasks, to be performed by the internal system, within the external system, during a 
specific time period. While the internal system boundaries and overall mission do not change for 
a given complex system, the external system boundaries and current mission tasks may 
frequently change depending on the system’s current use.  For example, an airplane would 
represent an internal system, and, regardless of what functions it is performing at a given time, it 
is always an airplane.  Similarly, the airplane’s mission of getting from point A to point B does 
not change.  However, the current mission task changes from taking off to cruising to landing, 
and the external system changes with the changing weather that the airplane may fly through 
during its trip.  
Understanding the possible complex uses of a complex system is where current methods 
primarily fall short in providing comprehensive failure analysis.  Most current failure analysis 
methods and tools, many of which are discussed in Chapter 2, typically only identify potential 
failures and how they might affect component and system-level behaviors.  These methods do 
not consider a failure’s effect on specific missions however. This mission-independence greatly 
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limits their analyses because during one mission task a failure may cause drastic changes to the 
system’s performance, while during another, that same failure might not be noticed at all, and 
thus, it is vital to know how the complex system is to be used in the future, after a failure occurs, 
in order to accurately identify the high-level effects of the failure.  For example, if a failure 
occurs in the drivetrain of a vehicle and causes the vehicle to no longer be able to turn left 
effectively, it might seem that the vehicle has suffered a critical failure because one of its main 
functions is removed. However, if the vehicle’s mission was only to transport something down 
and back a straight path, then the turning failure would be inconsequential.  Unlike current 
methods, the FIMA method presented in this paper would be able to recognize this and instead 
identify the failure as manageable for this specific mission.  Likewise, for the same vehicle 
system, if the mission or external system were changed to include turns or obstacles, the 
proposed method would look for all possible paths that only require right turns and if no such 
solutions existed, then, and only then, would the failure be considered critical.   
As well as knowing which functions are still achievable, it is also important to know if 
there are any functional or control redundancies that could help restore the lost functionalities; a 
functional redundancy is the utilization of healthy components in a new fashion in order to 
compensate for reduced or lost functionalities of unhealthy components, and a control 
redundancy is a parameter change to maintain nominal performance [1,2].  Understanding a 
system’s functional and control redundancies is the first step towards optimizing a system’s 
robustness.  Robustness is a system’s ability to adapt to failures and is vital in being able to 
extend its own lifespan and get the most use before any external involvement is needed, such as 
the replacement of faulty components. Robustness depends on a system’s ability to adapt its 
behavior or its mission plan after a failure occurs in order to increase its overall functional 
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efficiency.  The human body is an excellent example of a robust complex system as it is 
constantly adapting to failures through the use of redundancies.  For example, if you sprain your 
ankle, the body’s pain sensors will feel the failure and adjust its functionality by walking slower 
and with a limp; putting more weight on the healthy leg is a functional redundancy and walking 
slower is a control redundancy.  If these adjustments were not made and a normal walking style 
at a normal pace was continued then the injured ankle would be more susceptible to further 
injury and eventually total failure.  Unfortunately, non-living complex systems cannot feel pain 
and thus will attempt to continue operating at full capacity on unhealthy components, increasing 
the likelihood and rate of further degradation until a total failure occurs.  Therefore, new 
strategies, such as those presented in this paper, should be implemented in order to identify 
when, where, and which redundancies are needed.    
The FIMA method described in this paper is broken down into three phases of modeling 
and analysis to be used in the design process depending on how much system information is 
known; these phases are (1) qualitative, (2) quasi-quantitative, and (3) quantitative.  The 
qualitative analysis phase focuses on abstract failure modes, such as ‘Nominal,’ ‘Degraded,’ and 
‘Defective,’ and is designed to determine potential failure scenarios, identify the difference 
between initial and propagating faults, and ultimately, provide a qualitative complexity gauge for 
conceptual design comparisons.  The quasi-quantitative phase also focuses on abstract failure 
modes but allows for different degrees and types of degradation, such as a channel being ‘10% 
too big/small.’  This phase also incorporates physics-based equations to more accurately define a 
system’s behavior during nominal and faulty conditions, which is then used to assess and 
optimize the system’s performance for specific mission plans. Lastly, the quantitative phase 
implements specific failure modes, such as ‘20% Wear,’ and utilizes a physical testbed for 
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experimental validation. By providing support for all three phases of analysis, the FIMA method 
will allow for a much more streamlined analysis process by allowing the same adaptable model, 
which simply expands and becomes more comprehensive with each new learned piece of 
information about the system, to be used throughout the entire design process.   
A major issue with most current failure analysis methods is that during the design process 
the majority of failure information is only used to improve a system’s reliability, i.e. its 
probability to function given time and scenario before a failure occurs [3,4].  Unfortunately, 
however, no matter how reliable, all systems are guaranteed to eventually fail, and therefore, it is 
important for designers to begin using a system’s robustness [5,6], i.e. its ability to adapt to 
failures, just as seriously as its reliability, and the proposed FIMA method attempts to help with 
this problem.  Utilizing the FIMA method allows for comprehensive models and simulations of 
failure scenarios in complex systems, but also allows for specific mission assessments and 
optimizations based on a system’s robustness. This paper will explain the detailed theory and 
methodology for the qualitative and quasi-quantitative phases of the FIMA method, as well as 
providing example case studies for each phase, in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, where 
MATLAB/Simulink software was used to create the models.  The general description of the fully 




















The proposed method attempts to expand upon the research in model-based failure 
analysis by incorporating failure modes for not just components, but also manufacturing 
processes and environmental influences.  Function-based modeling enables a broad approach to 
failure analysis as it can be applied during early design stages when a system’s detailed 
information may not yet be known.  Function-based modeling can be used to examine multiple 
faults [7-32], and some can also help simulate propagating faults [7,8,19,32].  By using function-
based models, various components of different technology types, manufacturing processes, and 
physical connections, or lack of connections, between components can all be represented in the 
same failure simulation analysis.  The functional performances of the individual components, as 
well as the overall functional performance of the system, are then identified through discrete 
failure scenario simulations.  This paper’s research is based on this foundation of function-based 
design and failure analysis.  
Function-based modeling starts with a very abstract description and gets progressively 
more detailed. Function-based modeling classifies system functions into groups and subgroups, 
with abstract functional relationships connecting the high-level groups, and more detailed 
functional relationships connecting the low-level subgroups. These function groups are 
repeatedly divided into more and more detailed subgroups until the functions are detailed enough 
that specific components can be chosen to satisfy them [15].   For the purposes of the FIMA 
method, components are already chosen, however, the designer is responsible for determining 
their detailed functional relationships based on how each component’s function is related to the 
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desired overall system performance.  Then, depending on how much information is known, each 
component can be represented by either qualitative or quantitative equations.  When little 
information is known, qualitative math is used so that abstract values can be given to various 
components to represent certain abstract failure states with different degrees of degradation, 
which then allows for qualitative comparisons to be made between components [33].  For 
example, if a value of 5 is said to represent nominal performance and 0 represents defective 
performance, with the in between values representing degradations, then, if component(A)=5 and 
component(B)=2 then component(B) is said to be more degraded than component(A). Once 
sufficient information is known, however, more quantitative analysis with actual quantitative 
equations can be used to determine specific outputs. For example, a simple circuit would be 
given the equation V=I*R, but if the resistor lost 10% of its functionality, the new equation 
would become V=I*(.9R). 
Two of the main failure analysis methods currently used in industry are Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [34,35,36,37] and Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) [38,39].  However, these methods do not use function-based modeling.  These 
methods use only static failure definitions to identify the causes, effects, probabilities, and 
criticality of known failures that a system may experience. However, the analysis is explicitly on 
how a component’s failure will affect that single component’s performance, while the 
propagating effects on the other components’ and the overall system’s functions are not explored.  
Moreover, different use-cases, or missions, are not explored and therefore, these methods are 
limited when it comes to analyzing complex systems with complex behaviors. Also, because 
these are static methods that do not incorporate behavioral models, they rely on a fair amount of 
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detailed information to be known about the system in order to provide any useful analysis, which 
means they cannot typically be applied until late in the design process.   
On the other hand, existing methods that do explore model-based failure analysis include 
the Function-Failure Design Method (FFDM) [13,21], Function-Failure Identification and 
Propagation (FFIP) [8,19], and Risk in Early Design (RED) [22,24,25]. These methods focus on 
function-based modeling to identify the behavioral effects of a system’s possible failure modes, 
as well as how failures might propagate through the system.  Function-failure methods generally 
only care about whether or not an individual component is experiencing a functional failure, such 
as a valve not opening all the way, and how this affects the overall system performance, while 
the causes of these failures may be ignored.  Therefore, less detailed information is required to 
make these models, allowing them to be implemented early in the design process.  Some 
methods, such as FFIP, also provide a more expansive analysis by including physics-based 
behavioral equations in order to more accurately define failure effects on system performance.  
Unfortunately, these methods, similar to FMEA and FMECA, do not consider the various 
potential missions that a system may be asked to perform, and therefore, they provide only a 
limited understanding when it comes to complex systems and their complex behaviors. 
Other forms of analysis include dependency-based methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) [40], which is a top-down approach that starts with a component’s possible failures and 
works downward to determine all possible causes for each failure.  The process begins by 
identifying the different ways that component functions may be limited.  For example, if analysis 
were being done on a vehicle, the process would begin by identifying potential high-level 
failures, such as a transmission failure. Then, the approach would be to work downward with less 
abstract descriptions to identify the different possible causes for this failure, such as the gears 
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being broken, the clutch being jammed, or through power loss, until all possible causes and the 
responsible components have been described in sufficient detail.  This same style of identifying 
causality will be used by the FIMA method, however it will be used for determining functional 
relationships for fault propagation purposes, where instead of choosing effects and working 
downward to identify causes, the FIMA method chooses high-level system functions and works 
downward to identify components that provide these functions.  Also, while this paper explores 
modeling with MATLAB/Simulink, the modeling of functional relationships could also be done 
using formal modeling languages, such as SysML. [41,42] 
Other methods introduce functional and control redundancies, as well as other criteria to 
help enhance a system’s robustness [1,2,3,4].  Redundancies, as previously mentioned, are when 
healthy components take on extra responsibilities and functionality in order to compensate for 
unhealthy components.  Self-maintenance machines are one such technology that use control and 
functional redundancies [1,2], however they only identify these once the design is already 
completed and cannot identify any of the backup procedures without first knowing the potential 
failure scenarios or failure probabilities, and therefore cannot be applied until such information is 






















3.1. Phase I: Overview 
 
3.1.1. General Theory 
 
Phase I of the FIMA research was previously published and presented by the author at the 
2014 ASME IDETC/CIE conference as a stand-alone research project, and therefore, all 
information in Chapter 3 can be also found in that conference paper referenced in the “List of 
Publications” section [DeStefano & Jensen. 2014].  
The following sections detail the proposed approach for performing qualitative function-
based failure analysis on complex systems during early design stages. This analysis can be used 
during any design stage, however, typically it would only be used during early design stages of 
novel systems when detailed information about the system is not known, i.e. governing equations 
or failure modes. If such detailed information were already available it would likely be more 
beneficial to skip straight to Phase II for quasi-quantitative analysis. Despite only providing a 
qualitative analysis, Phase I of the FIMA method provides valuable abstract failure information, 
such as possible failure scenarios, fault propagation paths, critical versus manageable failure 
scenarios, and complexity gauges of the design.  Phase I analysis is to be used to compare 
multiple potential concept designs in hopes of being able to identify the best options, or at least 
being able to eliminate the worst.   
During this phase, the first step is to create an abstract model of functional relationships 
and dependencies between the system’s components. These functional relationships are the 
framework for further, more detailed analysis later on.  The models are not based on internal 
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system structure, but rather only on functionality, as well as any other factors that may affect a 
system’s performance, such as a component’s manufacturing process or environmental 
influences. Structure is not valued here because in complex systems where components can 
transfer electrical, material, or signal information, just because two components may be next to 
each other structurally, they do not necessarily have any interaction with one another.  Therefore, 
only a component’s functionality is assessed. 
The FIMA method uses Simulink state-flow models to identify the functional 
relationships and the different potential failure modes, and uses MATLAB coding to initiate 
failure scenario simulations. MATLAB and Simulink were used as the modeling software for 
this research, however the FIMA method should also be able to be applied using any other state-
based, signal processing software. Each system component within the Simulink model is 
connected to one another based on their functional relationships, i.e. the components that are 
directly dependent on the performances of the other. Each component has two types of Simulink 
diagrams: a state-machine diagram and a failure-logic diagram. State-machines allow for a 
component to switch between any of its potential performance states, such as “Good 
Performance” or “Faulty Performance,” and then provide a performance value based on which 
state the component is currently located.  On the other hand, failure-logics are essentially the 
reverse, as they provide the state of a component based on its individual performance value as 
well as the performance values of all of its dependent components.  Simply put, state-machines 
are used to simulate multiple failure scenarios by identifying different combinations of 
performance states throughout the system, and failure-logics are used to identify where the 
failures have occurred in the system for a specific scenario.  During the Phase I qualitative 
analysis, component state-machines contain three potential performance states: “Nominal,” 
12 
“Degraded,” and “Defective.”  While having only three performance states is very abstract, as 
most real-world components have more than one way to be “Degraded” or “Defective,” the more 
that is known about a system, the more detailed and extensive these faulty states can become; 
this expansion will be explored in more detail in the Phase II quasi-quantitative analysis method 
found in Chapter 4.  
3.1.2. General Methodology 
Once a system is chosen for modeling, the first step is to create a top-down functional 
relationship diagram by identifying the highest-level component, or components, that best 
express the overall performance of the system and then working downward to determine all 
dependent functional relationships.  For example, a functional relationship of a car would start 
with the wheels, because they are the component that actually allows the vehicle to move, and 
then the wheels would be dependent on the driveshaft, which would depend on the power 
system, and so forth, until every component was represented and related through their 
functionality.  Or for a simpler example, take a three component system where component(A) 









Figure 3.1 – Functional Relationships between three components  






Next, Simulink models are created based on these functional relationships. For qualitative 
models, the Simulink state-machines only contain abstract performance values based on the 
components’ different performance states and their functional relationships.  The functional 
relationships flow up, so analysis begins with the bottom components, which is component(A) 
for the aforementioned example.  If component(A) is in the “Nominal” state it would be given an 
abstract performance value, which for the purposes of this example we will set equal to 10.  On 
the other hand, if component(A) is in the “Degraded” state its performance value will be 9, or the 
“Nominal” performance value minus one, i.e. 10-1=9, and if it is “Defective” it will be 0. Then, 
component(B)’s “Nominal” state will inherit component(A)’s performance value and then 
proceed through the same subtraction for its “Degraded” state, while a “Defective” state is 
always given a performance value of 0.  That is to say that if component(A) is “Nominal,” i.e. 
has a performance value of 10, and if component(B) is also “Nominal,” then its performance 
value would also be 10 or it’s “Degraded” value would be 9, but if component(A) is “Degraded,” 
i.e. has a performance value of 9, then if component(B) is “Nominal” its performance value 
would be 9 and its “Degraded” value would be 8, and this process progresses for any number of 
components (A-Z).  So, for the example three-component system in Figure 3.1, if all three 
components were “Nominal” then they would all three have performance values of 10. However, 
if component(A) and component(B) are degraded from extended use, but component(C) is brand 
new, then component(A) would be labeled “Degraded” with a performance value of 9, 
component(B) would be labeled “Degraded” with a performance value of 8, and component(C) 
would be labeled as “Nominal” with a performance value of 8. This subtraction method is used 
so that if a single component becomes “Degraded” the reduced performance value will propagate 
to the next dependent component, however it will not necessarily be labeled as “Degraded,” it 
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would simply have a lower “Nominal” value; a component is only labeled “Degraded” if its 
decreased performance value is caused by an initial internal failure rather than by fault 
propagation. By making this distinction, we can easily identify if a component is affected by an 
initial or propagating failure based on the combination of its performance state and performance 
value. This allows for a quick check of how many initial faults are present within the system by 
comparing a component’s reduced performance value with the designated nominal value. For 
example, if a component, such as component(C) in the previous example, shows a “Nominal” 
state with a performance value of 8, instead of 10, then this indicates that there are 2 preceding 
failures in the system, and the component’s failure-logic diagram could then be used to identify 
where these initial failures occurred.  More detailed examples of state-machines and failure-logic 
diagrams will be explored in the following case study. 
Once the Simulink model is completed, the next step is to develop a code in MATLAB 
that can simulate the Simulink model to automatically generate possible failure scenarios by 
identifying all possible combinations of the programmed failure modes. A detailed example of 




3.2. Phase I Case Study: MEMS DNA Sequencer 
 
3.2.1. Case Study: Overview 
 
 Along with advanced technologies becoming more and more complex, many are also 
becoming smaller and smaller; one such product area is known as MEMS, or micro-
electromechanical systems. Many of these devices deal with electrochemical machines and 
quantum physics, which can cause difficulty in understanding potential failure modes during 
early design phases. This lack of detail when it comes to electrochemical devices and quantum 
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physics is a perfect example of when the FIMA method’s Phase I qualitative analysis can be 
highly beneficial. Therefore, the case study presented in this paper will introduce such a device: 
a MEMS Nanochannel DNA sequencing device [43,44].  
The device, i.e. the internal system, as seen magnified in Figure 3.2, is comprised of a 
microchannel inlet and a microchannel outlet connected by a nanochannel, represented by the 
dashed line, along with transmitting and receiving electrodes on either side of the nanochannel; 
the image depicts five electrodes, however, this paper’s model only deals with one for the sake of 
simplicity. Including all five electrodes in the model would more accurately represent the 
system’s robustness due to the enhanced functional redundancy, however for the purposes of 
Phase I, the goal is to simply show that the qualitative process works for basic failure 
identification and mission assessment at even such a low level of detail.  More detailed analysis 
that will incorporate redundancies for mission optimization is reserved for the case study seen 








Figure 3.2 - MEMS Nanochannel DNA Sequencer. [43,44] 
 
The modeled device uses the quantum principle of electron tunneling to detect and 
sequence a strand of DNA that traverses through the nanochannel, however, in the current 
developmental stage of this device, nanobeads are used to represent DNA strands. The theory 
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behind this device is that because DNA consists of four nucleotide bases, thymine (T), adenine 
(A), cytosine (C), and guanine (G), each with a different internal resistance, when the 
transmitting electrode emits a current at a passing DNA, or nanobead, the receiving electrode 
will register different voltages based on which nucleotide base is passing by, blocking the 
transmitted current [41,42]; this goal of identifying and sequencing the DNA would be 
considered the system’s mission.  Due to only a limited number of components, this device 
appears to have a fairly low complexity. However, the case study will show that the Phase I 
model is able to simulate a very large number of possible failure scenarios, which will illustrate 
how even seemingly simple devices can still have more failure scenarios than a human designer 
could ever think of within a reasonable timeframe, without the use of simulations. 
3.2.2. Case Study: Methodology 
 
 First, the system’s functional relationships had to be determined. Because this is a device 
with no moving parts, it can be more difficult to understand how failures might propagate, as an 
individual component has no means of influencing any other component through physical 
contact, rather only through complex combinations of electrical, material, or signal flows. 
However, it is because of this fact that this device is a perfect example for the proposed FIMA 
method’s qualitative analysis. Applying the proposed method to this device demonstrates how 
structural relationships do not matter, but instead, it is only functional relationships that matter 
for determining the system’s overall performance. In this case study, the focus is on how each 
component’s functional performance affects the final measurement of the DNA, therefore 
making the receiving electrode the highest-level component. A simple representation of the 
functional relationships for the device can be seen in Figure 3.3. The diagram also displays how 
the Simulink model will be approached; a component’s influence flows up, meaning components 
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Figure 3.3 - Functional Relationship Diagram for Nanochannel DNA Sequencer 
 
Figure 3.3, identifies how the functional relationships between the components’ 
manufacturing and performance states will be modeled, where a state-machine and a failure logic 
will be created for each block.  Beginning at the low-level components and moving up, it can be 
seen that the state of the microfabrication of the nanochannel (NCMF) directly affects the 
performance state of the nanochannel (NBNC). The performance state of the nanochannel is also 
affected by the microfabrication and performance states of both the microchannel inlet 
(MCIMF/MCI) and the microchannel outlet (MCOMF/MCO). This is due to the fact that if the 
inlet or outlet is faulty, such as by being clogged, the result would respectively be either no 
nanobeads being able to enter or no nanobeads being able to exit the nanochannel, both of which 
would produce a non-nominal state within the nanochannel.   Next, the state of the nanochannel, 
along with the microfabrication and performance state of the transmitting electrode (ETMF/ET), 
combine to determine the conditions of the nanobead (NBE). For example, if the nanochannel is 
not the right size or if the transmitting electrode does not emit the correct current then the 
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nanobead will not be able to be accurately measured.  Finally, the performance state of the 
receiving electrode (ER) is affected by its microfabrication (ERMF) and the nanobeads’ 
conditions when they are between electrodes. Accurately identifying these functional 
relationships is vital in being able to properly detect the difference between initial and 
propagating failures.  For example, if the nanochannel were “Degraded,” such as not being the 
correct size, this would result in an inaccurate measurement taken by the receiving electrode 
without any failure to the receiving electrode itself.  Similarly, if the transmitting electrode is 
“Degraded” and emits a faulty current, then the receiving electrode will again have inaccurate 
measurements without any failure to itself, or, lastly, the nanobead itself could cause an 
inaccurate receiving electrode measurement, such as by being damaged or moving too fast.  All 
three listed examples of propagating failures, as well as initial failures of a degraded 
manufacturing or performance of the receiving electrode itself, will result in inaccurate 
measurements, however, by accurately identifying the functional relationships and through the 
use of Simulink state-machines and failure-logic diagrams the FIMA method should be able to 
effectively identify the root cause of the faulty measurements.  
A Simulink diagram is created using state-machine and failure logic diagrams instead of 
the blocks used in the functional relationships diagram. An overview of the entire Simulink 
model can be seen in Figure A1 in the Appendix, and examples of two different performance 
state-machines and a failure-logic diagram can be seen in Figures A2, A3 and A4, respectively.  
State-machine and failure-logic diagrams consist of two main parts: state-blocks and transition 
lines. The values and equations in each state-block represent the output performance states and 
values for that component, and the values and equations on each line represent the inputs that 
determine which state-block to activate, i.e. the state-machine begins at the default value, 
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represented by a line open at one end and connected to a state-block on the other, then the model 
observes the inputs, finds a matching transition line, and then transitions the component into that 
state. 
After the Simulink model is finished, the next step is to write a MATLAB code that 
simulates all combinations of potential performance states found in every component, where 
each possible combination is known as a failure scenario. As seen in Figure 3.3, the overall 
system is comprised of 11 parts, counting both manufacturing processes and functional 
performance for each internal system component, as well as the nanobeads.  However, the 
Simulink model includes a state-machine and failure-logic diagram for each component and 
therefore, there are 22 parts, as seen in Figure A1. The system inputs, seen as the small circles 
feeding into the left side of each component in Figure A1, represent the performance states being 
designated for each component during any given scenario. The system outputs, seen as the small 
circles exiting from the right side of the components, represent the components’ failure-logic and 
performance values. If all 11 components failed simultaneously, there would be a massive 
number of possible failure scenarios, and while simulating this would be possible, it does not 
seem probable as a real-world scenario. So, for the purposes of this paper, the MATLAB code is 
designed to simulate all possible failure scenarios based on the programmed functional 
relationships for single, double, and triple type failure scenarios i.e. all failure scenarios initiated 
by any combination of one, two, or three initial component failures, respectively. 
3.2.3. Case Study: Results and Discussion 
 
 After all simulations were complete, it was determined that there were 22 possible failure 
scenarios for single failures, 220 failure scenarios for double failures, and 1320 failure scenarios 
for triple failures. Also, by examining the performance states of the highest-level component in 
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the functional relationship diagram, i.e. the receiving electrode, it was determined that for the 
single type simulations, 9 of the 22 failure scenarios, or roughly 41%, resulted in critical failures.  
Critical failures are classified as when the receiving electrode’s performance value is 0, either 
through initial or propagating failures, and manageable failures are when the receiving 
electrode’s performance state is not 0; an example of the output data set for single failures can be 
seen in Figure 3.4, where each row is a different failure scenario and the columns are the failure-
logic states for each component and the performance value for the receiving electrode.   For the 
double type simulations, 144 of the 220 failure scenarios, or roughly 65%, resulted in critical 
failures, and for the triple type, 1056 of the 1320 failure scenarios, or roughly 80%, resulted in 
critical failures.  The reason every “Defective” performance state did not result in a critical 
failure in this example was because the microchannel outlet was given time-based failures.  For 
example, if the microchannel outlet was full or experienced a blockage, the effect would not 
instantly be seen in the nanochannel.  Only after a certain amount of time would the blockage 



















Figure 3.4 – Single Type Failure Scenario Results 
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Ultimately, the proposed method was able to simulate the case study model for all single, 
double, and triple failure scenarios. The example device used in the case study, which was only 
comprised of five main components, might intuitively be thought of as a fairly simple design, 
without that many possible ways of failing. However, this paper has demonstrated how even 
seemingly simple devices can, in fact, have a vast array of possible failure scenarios, many of 
which result in critical failures. This shows how with so many possibilities for failure, even on a 
seemingly simple design, a human designer could potentially overlook critical failure scenarios 
that may eventually cause costly redesigns down the line. Using the proposed method, along with 
some additional clustering analysis of the results, designers should be able to determine valuable 
failure information early on in the design process. Such information includes how each 
component’s functional performance relates to the design’s overall performance, how many 
failure scenarios are possible, how many failure scenarios are critical vs. manageable, which 
components are most sensitive, i.e. involved in the most failure scenarios/most critical failure 
scenarios, which manufacturing processes are most critical, and many others. Also, despite only 
one design having been talked about in regards to this device, this qualitative analysis would be 
very useful when there are multiple potential designs in question.  
In general, designers want to limit complexity as much as possible in their designs, and 
this type of qualitative analysis provides two very useful pieces of complexity information: (1) 
the higher the involvement of a component, the higher the component complexity, and (2) the 
more possible failure scenarios, the higher the overall device complexity. With these two criteria, 
a designer can compare two or more potential device designs to determine which design has the 
most balanced component involvement and the fewest failure scenarios.  Unfortunately, this 
device did not provide a very adaptable system model, as it only had one possible mission, i.e. 
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sequence DNA, and did not have any functional redundancies, due to limiting the number of 
electrodes within the model, and therefore, the full extent of the FIMA method’s mission 
assessment and optimization capabilities were not completely explored in this case study.  
Nevertheless, the Phase I qualitative analysis method has effectively laid the ground work for 
further, more comprehensive analysis, which will be explored in the following chapter where the 
quasi-quantitative analysis method will be explained, as well as demonstrated on an adaptable 







































4.1. Phase II: Overview 
 
4.1.1. General Theory 
 
While Phase I of the proposed FIMA method effectively laid the framework for more 
detailed models and simulations, as well as effectively provided a variety of valuable early-stage 
failure information, the main benefits of the FIMA method begin with the Phase II quasi-
quantitative analysis.  During Phase II, additional information, such as a system’s behavioral 
equations and conditional functional objectives, are to be added to the already created, 
qualitative model. During this phase, both the Simulink models and MATLAB code must be 
updated to allow for more complex behaviors and mission plans.  Governing equations are added 
to each Simulink state-machine in order to more accurately describe how different types of 
failures may influence the system’s behavior.  Such behavioral equations are essential in 
understanding how failures at varying levels of severity, not just “Degraded” and “Defective,” 
may propagate through complex systems.   
During the Phase I qualitative analysis the only concern was if a failure occurred, not how 
it occurred and therefore, only one “Degraded” and one “Defective” performance states were 
created. This was due to the assumption that only limited behavioral knowledge of the 
components would be known during the early design stages.  Once this information is known, 
however, each “Degraded” and “Defective” performance state will likely need to be separated 
into multiple states to identify different types of degradation that a component may experience, 
such as a channel becoming too small or too big, possibly from clogs or wear, respectively, each 
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of which would have different effects on the overall behavior of the system.  Next, the models 
are updated to allow for different degrees of failure severity.  For example, the qualitative 
analysis would only have “Degraded” and “Defective” states, however, during the quasi-
quantitative analysis a “Degraded” failure’s severity can be simulated anywhere on a scale of 0-
100% degraded for the component’s functionality, as well as its speed if applicable.  Also, if a 
“Defective” failure occurs, a failed position can be identified, such as the airplane’s landing gear 
from the earlier example, failing open or closed.  Being able to identify different severity and 
types of failures is very important in being able to understand how various mission tasks will be 
affected.  For example, if the landing gear becomes “Defective” and fails in the open position 
after takeoff, the failure would still be manageable as the cruising performance would only be 
degraded, however, if the landing gear fails in the closed position, this would result in a critical 
failure as now the landing task would not be achievable without crashing.     
4.1.2. General Methodology 
Once all Simulink and MATLAB updates are completed, the user can begin simulating 
specific failure combinations for general system analysis, as well as specific mission analysis.  
First, the user will be prompted by MATLAB to input the health state of each component; the 
health state includes whether a failure has occurred and, if so, what type of failure it is, and 
lastly, how severe it is.  With this information, the updated behavioral models will be able to 
calculate the remaining functionalities of the overall system.  Next, the user can input specific 
mission tasks, such as move from point A to point B to point C.  Then, the program identifies the 
remaining functions that are capable of completing each individual task based on the system’s 
current health.  If the remaining functions are not capable of completing the mission tasks, then 
the program will indicate that the mission is not possible and will specify which parts are 
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responsible for losing that specific capability.  If the mission is possible, the program will 
indicate this along with what, if any, redundancies were needed. Redundancies are based on the 
optimization portion of the program.   
The MATLAB code’s optimization is based on trying to balance the failures throughout 
the system by looking at each component’s health and all possible remaining solutions to the 
individual mission tasks, and then ranking the faulty components from most degraded to least 
degraded. Then, if a system has three parts for example, the program looks at the top 20 solutions 
that limit the necessary functionality for the most degraded component, from which the top 10 
solutions are then chosen for the second most degraded component, from which the top solution 
for the least degraded component is finally chosen as the “best” solution.  By performing this 
type of optimization, the goal is to create a balanced rate of degradation by forcing the least 
degraded components to compensate for the most degraded, but still limiting these 
compensations as much as possible.  This is done to extend a system’s lifespan by keeping it 
from suffering a critical failure in one part, while all other parts are still healthy.  For example, a 
system would be able to get much more use if all parts were 90% degraded before one of them 
finally failed, as opposed to one part failing when all the other parts are only 20% degraded.  
This optimization is used to create the “best” course of action to complete specific mission tasks, 
but the “best” course of action is defined within the MATLAB code based on the necessary 
importance of certain aspects of the mission.  For example, a system could be optimized to 
complete a mission in the shortest amount of time, or it could be optimized to repeat a mission 
the most possible times before a critical failure occurs; for the case study described in the 
following section, the system was optimized for the latter.  Lastly, the optimization procedure 
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will not only help balance failure degradation among components but will also help make all 
mission plans more robust. 
Lastly, metrics within the MATLAB code are created to provide a system’s Overall 
Coverage Rating (OCR), Mission Time, and Mission Robustness Ratings (MRR).  Overall 
Coverage Rating is the ratio of a faulty system’s remaining possible functionalities versus a 
nominal system’s possible functionalities.  This OCR value will identify how much of a system’s 
functionality was eliminated by the system’s current failure scenario.  The Mission Time value 
will be the time it takes to complete all of the mission’s tasks based on the optimized solutions.  
Lastly, the Mission Robustness Ratings are essentially the same as the OCR, however, there is an 
MRR for each individual mission task in order to identify which tasks are most affected by the 
current failure scenario.   The OCR and MRR values are then used to compare and improve 
mission plans for specific failure scenarios, based on which missions are more robust and 
therefore, which will be better able to handle further system degradations. In the following 
sections, this method will be applied to an adaptable robot arm system. 
 
 
4.2. Phase II Case Study: 3-Linkage Robotic Arm 
 
4.2.1. Case Study: Overview 
 
 Despite the fact that the same model is meant to be used and expanded through each of 
the three FIMA phases, because the system used in the Phase I case study is a real system that is 
currently still only in the early design stage, a new 3-linkage robotic arm system, with a Base 
Joint that rotates on the X-Y axis, and three Arm Joints that rotate on the r-Z axis, as seen in 
Figure 4.1, was chosen for the Phase II case study. This robotic arm system was chosen because 
it has a well understood behavior with known governing equations, as well as the fact that it is an 
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adaptable complex system with multiple functional redundancies and mission possibilities, 
which will serve as an excellent example for the FIMA method’s mission analysis capabilities.  
The robotic arm system described here is meant to represent a potential manufacturing robot that 
might be found on a factory floor assembly line that would have missions of moving objects 









Figure 4.1 – 3-Linkage Robotic Arm Assembly  
Unfortunately, when everything is working nominally there is no simple way of 
determining how good a mission plan truly is, and it is only when specific failures begin to 
appear that any accurate mission analysis can really take place. For example, one mission plan 
might only require moving an object a short distance, but one of the locations is at the robot’s 
maximum reach, while another mission plan has the robot moving an object much further 
distances, but the locations are closer to the base.  While the first mission plan may be quicker 
and require fewer movements, therefore, making it seem like the better mission, just a small 
degradation is all that would be necessary to make the maximum reach unachievable, making the 
first mission plan impossible, while the second mission plan would go virtually unaffected.  This 
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shows how the differentiation between how various missions will react to a given failure 
scenario is of the utmost importance because depending on the type of failures that occur, a 
system may need to re-optimize or possibly even completely change a mission plan.  This 
analysis problem is why the ability to identify the “best” mission based on the Mission 
Robustness Ratings for each mission task is one of the major unique contributions of the FIMA 
method.  Therefore, this robustness analysis will be addressed in much greater detail in this case 
study. 
4.2.2. Case Study: Methodology 
 
The first step of Phase II was to create an updated, quasi-quantitative Simulink model 
with state-machines and failure-logics for each component: the Base Joint, Joint1, Joint2, and 
Joint3.  Because all of the components are the same type of mechanism, i.e. joints, the state-
machines were all able to be nearly identical, differing only in their governing equations’ 
nominal values; the Base is defined as having a nominal movement range of 0 to 180 degrees, 
Joint1 can range from 0 to 90 degrees, and Joint2 and Joint3 can each range from -180 to 180 
degrees.  Each joint was sampled every 1 degree. Sensitivity analysis was done by altering the 
sampling size to every 3 degrees, as well as every 6 degrees, for each of the use-cases in section 
4.2.3.  For the 3-degree sampling size the differences in the resulting OCR, MRR, and Mission 
Time values were minor (average differences of less than 1% for the OCR values, roughly 2% 
for the MRR values, and roughly 1 minute for the Mission Times), however, for the 6-degree 
sampling size the difference in results were quite significant and unpredictable.  Each linkage 
was then given a length of 3 feet and the nominal rotational speed of each was defined as 30 
degrees per second. Next, for simplicity sake, during this case study it was assumed that there 
were no obstacles within the arm’s movement range, i.e. no external system failures.  Also, the 
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linkages were identified as connecting off-axis in order to allow the arm to rotate in on itself.  
These criteria were all chosen arbitrarily for this example and would likely differ depending on 
the type of arm assembly and quality of components. Also, these criteria could easily be changed 
to include obstacles or exclude certain types of arm movements by adding limitations within the 
MATLAB code.  Lastly, all arm coordinates were then calculated using the following forward 
kinematic equations within the MATLAB code:  
 
r = L1*cos(Theta1)+L2*cos(Theta1+Theta2)+L3*cos(Theta1+Theta2+Theta3)          (1) 
Z = L1*sin(Theta1)+L2*sin(Theta1+Theta2)+L3*sin(Theta1+Theta2+Theta3)           (2) 
X = LR*sin(Theta0)                                                         (3) 
Y = LR*cos(Theta0)                                                         (4) 
 
where the three arm joints are located in the r-Z coordinate plane, and the base is located in the 
X-Y coordinate plane. Also, L1, L2, and L3 are the lengths of the three arm linkages, LR is the 
total length of the arm in the r-direction, and Theta0, Theta1, Theta2, and Theta3 are the joint 
angles for the Base, Joint1, Joint2, and Joint3, respectively.  Examples of the different state-
based governing equations within the Simulink state-machines used for updating each joint’s 
movement range, i.e. adjusting the minimum and maximum rotational angles as well as each 
joint’s movement speed for given failure scenarios, can be seen for the Base Joint in Figures A5-
A7. 
 The Simulink model and MATLAB code are related in such a way that the input data for 
the Simulink model will come from the first portion of the MATLAB code and user inputs, then 
this information will be processed and outputted from Simulink back into the second portion of 
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the MATLAB code.  The Simulink inputs consist of multiple variables for each component that 
are dependent upon the user’s responses to prompts generated by the MATLAB code.  The user 
inputs the health of each component, as well as the degree of failure and type of failure that they 
wish to have simulated; the types of failure for this system are movement and speed-based.  A 
joint’s movement range can be “Defective,” resulting in the joint being stuck at a user-specified 
angle, or it can be “Degraded,” anywhere from 0-100% that can then be applied to either a 
Lower, Middle, or Upper limitation.  For example, a 10% Lower limitation for a range of 0-180 
degrees would result in a new range of 18-180 degrees, a 10% Middle limitation would result in 
a new range of 9-171 degrees, and a 10% Upper limitation would result in a new range of 0-162 
degrees.  Likewise, a joint’s speed can also be “Degraded” anywhere from 0-100%.  Also, along 
with the user-inputted, failure-based speed degradation, a joint’s speed is also programmed to 
decrease linearly over time depending on the component’s lifespan rating, i.e. if a joint has a 
lifespan of 10,000 180 degree movements with a speed of 30 degrees per second, then if that 
joint moves 180 degrees 5,000 times it will now only be capable of moving at 15 degrees per 
second. 
The Simulink model first processes the current state of each component based on the 
user’s inputs and then provides output data, such as updated performance values and new 
minimum and maximum achievable angles and speeds, that will then be processed by the 
MATLAB code to determine the Overall Coverage Rating, as well as the graphical representation 
of all functionalities for the overall system, which can be seen in Fig. 4.2; the top two plots 
represent the overall coverage of the arm for a nominal system on the X-Y and r-Z axes, 
respectively, and the bottom two plots represent the remaining coverage for a random faulty 
system. The example faults present in the bottom plots were: a 20% Middle limitation for the 
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Base, a 25% Middle limitation for Joint1, a 40% Upper limitation for Joint2, and a 35% Lower 
limitation for Joint3.   
 
Figure 4.2 – Possible Movement Coverage for 3-Linkage Robot Arm  
(Top: Nominal, Bottom: Degraded) 
(Left: X-Y axis, Right: r-Z axis) 
 
Next, the user will be asked to input various mission details, such as the various tasks, i.e. 
moving an object from point A to point B in the [X,Y,Z] coordinate plane, as well as how many 
cycles of these tasks need to be completed.  Each [X,Y,Z] location was given a margin of error of 
0.2 feet based on the assumption that the arm’s claw would be at least slightly bigger than the 
object it is picking up.  These user inputs will then result in mission-specific output data that will 
be compared with the overall system output data to determine mission feasibility, to optimize the 
32 
mission plan, and to identify any redundancies or repairs that may be needed.   An example of 
the plot generated comparing the original, nominal arm angles to the degraded but optimized arm 
angles for a given mission can be seen in Fig. 4.3; the mission tasks were to move between two 
arbitrarily chosen points, [3,4,4] to [2,2,5], and the degraded plot was for the same example 
failure scenario as seen in Fig. 4.2, where Joint2 is the most degraded component and therefore, 
the movements were optimized for Joint2. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Nominal (Left) vs. Optimized for Degradation (Right) arm positions  
on the r-Z axis 
 
For this system, two use-cases were explored in the following section.  The first is using 
the FIMA method for comparing two different missions during the same failure scenarios, and 
the second is utilizing the failure data to optimize a set mission plan to handle further failures by 
altering the position of the entire robot. 
4.2.3. Case Study: Results and Discussion 
 
4.2.3.1. Use-Case 1: Mission Comparisons 
 
The first use-case of the FIMA method’s quasi-quantitative analysis was to evaluate 
different mission plans, i.e. different sets of tasks, or initial and final positions, for different 
failure scenarios in order to show that by using the Overall Coverage Rating (OCR) and the 
Mission Robustness Ratings (MRR) the FIMA method can accurately identify which mission 
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plan is best.  The mission data for this use-case can be seen in Table 4.1.  This mission data 
includes three different failure scenarios, where three failure factors for each component are 
identified: Percent Degraded-Range, Limitation Type, and Percent Degraded-Speed, respectively.  
Each scenario is then evaluated for two different mission plans: A and B.  Each mission plan is 
responsible for two tasks: moving the robotic arm from an Initial position to a Final position, and 
these missions are to be repeated 250 times.  The outputs for each mission are the Mission 
Feasibility (including which component the mission’s optimization was based), the total Mission 
Time, and the Mission Robustness Ratings for both mission tasks, i.e. the initial and final points. 
Table 4.1 – Mission Data for Use-Case 1 
 Failure Scenario #1 Failure Scenario #2 Failure Scenario #3 
Base 0%, None, 0% 0%, None, 0% 0%, None, 0% 
Joint1 5%, Upper, 1% 10%, Upper, 1% 45%, Upper, 1% 
Joint2 12%, Middle, 1% 24%, Middle, 1% 48%, Middle, 1% 
Joint3 9%, Lower, 1% 18%, Lower, 1% 47%, Lower, 1% 
OCR 75.4% 56.1% 15.1% 
 A B A B A B 
Initial [3,4,5] [2,3,4] [3,4,5] [2,3,4] [3,4,5] [2,3,4] 
Final [-2,3,6] [-3,4,6] [-2,3,6] [-3,4,6] [-2,3,6] [-3,4,6] 
Cycles 250 250 250 250 250 250 
Feasibility Y, FO-J2 Y, FO-J2 Y, FO-J2 Y, FO-J2 Y, FO-J2 Y, FO-J2 
Time 24.01 min 46.68 min 23.73 min 50.63 min 24.57 min 37.86 min 
MRRi 94.3% 95.2% 89.1% 55.8% 27.6% 27.3% 
MRRf 95.2% 91.4% 90.1% 86.0% 32.0% 30.4% 
 
For Failure Scenario #1, the Overall Coverage Rating for the arm is 75.4%, which 
indicates that roughly a quarter of the system’s total functionality has been lost.  Next, looking at 
the two mission plans, both are feasible and both were functionally optimized for Joint 2, which 
is what was expected due to the fact that Joint 2 was the most degraded component.  Finally, the 
mission time, MRRi, and MRRf values are evaluated.  MRRi and MRRf are the Mission 
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Robustness Ratings for each of the mission tasks, i.e. the initial and final positions. For the time 
comparison, the shorter the Mission Time the better.  However, the shortest mission is not always 
the most robust and this is where the Mission Robustness Ratings’ importance is seen. As 
mentioned earlier, the individual Mission Robustness Ratings are indicators of how the system 
handles specific failure scenarios for its various mission tasks, and it is desired that both MRRi 
and MRRf values are larger than the OCR due to the fact that the OCR indicates the overall, 
average robustness, and therefore, larger MRR values would signify that the mission plans have 
above average robustness. As seen in Table 4.1 both missions have relatively high MRRi and 
MRRf values, implying that neither mission was very affected by Failure Scenario #1, and they 
are also above the OCR value, which as previously mentioned, is desired.   However, when 
directly comparing mission A to mission B, mission A is better all-around, as it not only can 
complete the necessary 250 cycles faster, but the mission tasks are more robust on average than 
those for mission B.  Even after only the first failure scenario, mission A can be identified as the 
preferred mission plan, however to show that this assumption holds true for further degradations, 
Failure Scenario #2 and #3 were simulated.  As expected, mission A remains faster and more 
robust than mission B for all scenarios.  In Failure Scenario #2, mission A becomes significantly 
better in all categories than mission B.  However, in Failure Scenario #3, while mission A is still 
better, the different components’ degradations are becoming balanced through optimization, and, 
as expected, the optimization has also begun to balance each mission’s robustness ratings, as well 
as helping to decrease each of their mission times, reducing them both below even their far less 




4.2.3.2. Use-Case 2: Mission Adjustments 
 
 The second use-case for the FIMA method’s quasi-quantitative analysis was to 
demonstrate that by using the OCR and MRR values for a specific failure scenario, a mission 
plan could be greatly improved; both the failure scenario and mission plan were arbitrarily 
chosen for this study. Unfortunately, because certain mission plans might not be able to be 
altered, such as a robot picking up a bolt and then placing it on a specific area of a vehicle 
coming down the assembly line, the position of the entire robot itself might need to be altered in 
order to increase the system’s robustness. Therefore, it is assumed that the arm assembly is 
capable of being moved on the X-Y plane, such as by being placed on wheels, in order to 
optimize its position relative to the initial and final positions it must reach. As seen in Table 4.2, 
the original mission plan is again responsible for two tasks of moving the robotic arm from the 
initial position to the final position, 250 times, and the output variables for each mission are the 
same as for use-case 1: Mission Feasibility (including which component the mission’s 
optimization was based), total Mission Time, and Mission Robustness Ratings for both mission 
tasks.    
Table 4.2 – Mission Data for Use-Case 2 
Base 0% 
Joint1 15%, Lower, 1% 
Joint2 15%, Lower, 1% 
Joint3 20%, Middle, 1% 
OCR 57.6% 
  
 Original (Shift: -2Y) (Shift: +3X) (Shift: -1Y) 
Initial [-1,1,1] [-1,3,1] [-4,3,1] [-4,4,1] 
Final [4,3,-1] [4,5,-1] [1,5,-1] [1,6,-1] 
Cycles 250 250 250 250 
Feasibility Y, FO-J3 Y, FO-J3 Y, FO-J3 Y, FO-J3 
Time 71.57 min 44.46 min 34.99 min 31.03 min 
MRRi 17.9% 8.3% 60.5% 80.8% 
MRRf 50.3% 81.8% 53.1% 82.7% 
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 As seen in Table 4.2, when the failure scenario listed occurs, the original mission plan is 
identified as incredibly poor.  It is still feasible, however, both MRR values are well below the 
OCR, indicating that there are far better mission plans available, and this is where the designer 
would ideally be able to tweak the position of the robot in order to find a more robust mission 
plan.  First, a shift in the negative Y direction was applied, i.e. backing the robot away from the 
assembly line, and while this adjustment improved the mission time and the MRR of the final 
position, it reduced the MRR of the initial position.  Next, a shift in the positive X direction was 
applied, and this effectively improved the mission time and both MRR values, however, the 
MRR value of the final position is still below the OCR, so further improvements can still be 
made.  Finally, another shift in the negative Y direction was made and this resulted in vast 
improvements to both MRR values and the overall mission time.  While further improvements 
may have been possible through further adjustments, for the purposes of this study, these 
improvements were sufficient.  Ultimately, this study showed that by following the FIMA 
method, using the OCR and MRR values, a designer could effectively reduce the original 














The Failure Identification for Mission Analysis (FIMA) method proposed in this paper is 
designed to allow a single, adaptable model to be used throughout the entire design process of a 
complex system.  The method was shown to be able to provide models for qualitative failure 
analysis during early design stages, and then expand these models for quasi-quantitative analysis, 
as more information about the system becomes available during the later design stages.  By using 
the FIMA method, designers should no longer be required to create new models or switch 
analysis techniques throughout the different design stages, making the whole process much more 
efficient and streamlined than with existing failure analysis methods.  Moreover, the FIMA 
method uniquely allows for the simulations of manufacturing-based failures, as well as 
traditional function-based failures.  However, the biggest and most unique contribution made by 
the FIMA method is its ability to take a complex system’s failure information and use it for 
mission assessment and optimization.   
With the constant advancement of technology and the ever-growing capabilities of 
complex systems, it is absolutely vital to know what the system is being used for in order to 
accurately understand the effects of failures on the overall system performance, and the lack of 
this mission analysis is where current methods fall short. By using the FIMA method, on the 
other hand, mission assessments and optimizations can be performed in order to balance failure 
degradations and increase mission robustness for any number of mission plans in an effort to 
maximize a system’s use in between repairs.  This unique ability could be especially beneficial 
for complex systems that are incapable of receiving repairs, such as the NASA rovers exploring 
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Mars, because even if certain functions are lost due to failures, it is vital to know which functions 
and mission tasks are still feasible in order to maximize the amount of use the existing rovers can 
perform before new ones need to be sent.    
By utilizing failure information for mission analysis, the FIMA method can provide more 
comprehensive and useful information than other current failure analysis methods.  With next-
generation technologies becoming increasingly more complex, it is not enough anymore simply 
to know how a system will fail.  What the system will be doing, what environment it will be 
doing it in, and what functional adjustments are available must all be accurately identified in 
order to effectively analyze the effects of complex failures in a complex system, and the FIMA 
method has been designed to do just that.  First, the FIMA method identifies and assesses the 
potential functions and mission tasks that a complex system may be asked to perform, and then 
based on various potential failure scenarios, the functions and tasks that are the most and least 
robust can be identified.  Then, by using this information, the FIMA method is able to optimize 
the system’s performance in order to more effectively achieve specific mission plans for any 























 The benefit of the FIMA method does not end with its ability to provide failure 
simulations.  While initially, during Phase II, the health state of each component and the specific 
degree of failure must be inputted by the user, in the future, with the addition of actual sensor 
data, the same MATLAB code that is used for the quasi-quantitative simulations could be used as 
a diagnostics tool for real-time optimization of real-world physical systems.  In this capacity, the 
code would again not care about the causes of failure, but instead only about the system’s 
functional capabilities that remain. For example, in the manufacturing robot used for the Phase II 
case studies, instead of the user inputting a “Percent Degraded” value prior to a mission, an 
actual robot would run a quick system diagnostics check by rotating each individual joint to their 
minimum and maximum angles at peak speed.  Then, instead of the state-machines having to 
calculate the individual minimum and maximum values and speeds, the sensors would send their 
data directly back to the code that would then proceed as before to optimize the arm angles based 
on the different minimums and maximums.  Therefore, by using the FIMA method, a designer 
should be able to use the same model, built congruently with the physical design, from the early, 
conceptual design phases, all the way to the final detailed phases, and ultimately, into real-world 
application. 
Furthermore, future work on Phase III of the FIMA method will focus on a fully 
quantitative analysis approach by adding more detailed failure modes to the Phase II models.  
The quasi-quantitative analysis will always be somewhat abstract, as the specific causes of 
degradation for certain failure modes are not specified.  During a fully quantitative analysis 
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however, each failure mode can be expanded.  For example, if a wheel was “Degraded” in the 
qualitative and quasi-quantitative phases, in Phase III’s fully quantitative models, “Degraded” 
could be expanded into such failure modes as “Traction Loss Caused by Wear” or “Low Tire 
Pressure,” and then “Defective” could be either “Flat” or “Jammed,” and each one of these 
would result in their own behavioral equations as well.  Also, the failures could be separated to 
indicate different internal and external causes, i.e. “Jammed” could be caused by an internal 
malfunction that is a critical failure and cannot be fixed without a total part replacement, or the 
jam could be caused by an external failure, such as the wheel being stuck in mud, which would 
not be a critical failure in the sense that a component needs replacement, it would only be a 
failure on the system-level objective of movement. Phase III of the FIMA method would then 
also be able to determine such differences between failures and be able to inform the user the 
best course of action moving forward; if the first definition of “Jammed” is simulated, the system 
would produce an error message indicating that the mission cannot be completed and that the 
broken component must be replaced.  If the second definition of “Jammed” is simulated, the 
system would produce an error message that identifies this failure as an external failure only, and 
if corrected, perhaps through redundancies from other non-compromised components, such as by 
switching into 4-wheel drive, would have no long-lasting effects on the system.  This ability 
would allow the model to identify even more potential failure scenarios, as well as effectively 
label which are critical vs. manageable. 
The FIMA method’s Phase III quantitative analysis also will be to explore path-planning 
optimization.  During the Phase II robotic arm case study, it was assumed that there were no 
external obstacles and therefore, the arm was able to move between points in a straight line.  
However, in more complex cases, it will be necessary not only to know how failures affect the 
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arm’s possible angle combinations at mission points, but also how failures affect the arms ability 
to move around obstacle to get from one point to the other.  For example, some internal failures 
or external obstacles may affect the arm’s ability to move left and right, while others may affect 
the ability to move forwards and backwards, and so depending on the required mission plan, the 
arm’s path between points will need to be optimized, along with the joint’s angle combination 
optimization done in Phase II. 
Next, future work on the Phase III quantitative analysis will also include validation of the 
models through experimentation on a physical testbed.  For the case study examined in Phase II, 
the 3-linkage robot arm, this validation could be done a number of ways.  Mission abilities and 
times could be tested and compared with the failure scenarios and mission plans simulated 
through control input constraints for each joint’s speed and minimum and maximum angles, or 
by physically replacing the testbed’s healthy joints with different types of degraded joints.  
Degraded joints could be manufactured to have various degrees of wear, jams, or breaks and then 
based on each of these effects on rotational speeds and minimum and maximum angles, mission 
plans, arm positions and paths, and the effects of further degradation on the overall system 
performance could be tested. 
Lastly, future work on the FIMA method should include its application to more complex 
systems with more complex missions in order to show its scalability and its true merit for diverse 
applications.  One such application idea would be to use the FIMA method to create an advanced 
GPS system.  Currently, GPS systems are essentially external system failure analysis tools with 
mission optimization capabilities.  GPS, generally speaking, identifies a mission plan, or route, 
based on shortest mission time, and then based on external system failures, such as things like 
traffic jams, missed turns, and construction detours, the system identifies all remaining possible 
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solutions and then re-optimizes based on mission time and provides a new mission plan.   
However, GPS systems do not consider the condition or capabilities of the vehicle being driven.  
For example, if a vehicle is about to run out of gas the GPS will simply find the closest gas 
station, regardless of the path needed to get there, i.e. if there is a gas station half a mile away, 
but all up hill with multiple stops, and there is another gas station one mile away, but all down 
hill with no stops, the GPS will still identify the first gas station as the top choice.  However, by 
using the FIMA method, the system could identify the internal system failure of “Low Gas” and 
understand that the second gas station is better due to there being fewer and less exhaustive 
functionalities needed to get there.  This would be especially useful in the future when there are 
self-driving cars, as there will not be a human driver that understands coasting down hill requires 
less gas.  Similarly, if there was a quicker path to get somewhere, but some of the roads were dirt 
roads, a truck might have no problem, but a Ferrari would likely rather take a longer, smoother 
path, and therefore, knowing the type of vehicle can also influence a mission’s optimization. This 
is just one of many future possible applications for using the FIMA method to help optimize 
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Figure A1. Overview of Simulink Model used for MEMS DNA Sequencer 
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Figure A3. Example of part of a more complicated State-Machine (NBNC Component) 
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Figure A4. Example Failure-Logic Diagram (ET Component) 
 
 









Figure A7. Example 3 of State-based equations (Base Joint) 
 
